The UK voted to leave the European Union in 2016. Ten years later, the Labour government is debating whether to rejoin, citing Brexit as a net economic loss. But from my perspective, Brexit never really happened. The UK left its biggest marketplace and made it harder to travel to Europe. The experiment was never properly conducted, which makes it impossible to evaluate properly.

I examine six areas where Brexit should have delivered economic benefit: trade relationships, people and skills, capital and investment, industrial capacity, business environment, and resilience and self-sufficiency. The first two produced immediate consequences, most of them damaging. The remaining four represent a failure to use the freedoms Brexit theoretically recovered.

My conclusion is that Brexit was one of the most spectacular planning and implementation failures in modern British political history. Britain never found out whether Brexit could work, because it never tried to make it work.

I wrote this essay because I kept encountering two increasingly entrenched and opposing views about rich people, and I found both of them inadequate. One treats wealth as inherently suspect, the other treats markets as a cure-all. Neither asks the more useful question: what kinds of rich people does a country actually want?

This essay sets out a framework for answering that question. I argue that rich people are neither inherently good nor bad, and that the debate about wealth is badly distorted by a fixed-pie view of money that does not reflect how modern economies actually work. I draw upon UK and South African tax statistics to demonstrate just how concentrated the tax base is and how reliant public spending is on rich people paying tax.

From this, I propose a set of principles for the kind of wealthy person a country should actively try to attract and retain, covering how they earn, spend, invest and hold assets.

Alongside the Loch Ness Monster, the disappearance of several great industries is one of Scotland’s most intriguing mysteries. This mystery has puzzled me since I moved to Scotland in 2021. I did not expect this long-form essay to emerge from my investigations, nor did I expect it to reach around 25,000 words. Neither did I expect that the factors behind Scotland’s industrial decline over the past two centuries are still in play today, still undermining any attempts to revitalise industry.

Scotland was an industrial giant during the Industrial Revolution and the early 20th century, but now manufacturing contributes only one-tenth of Scotland’s economic output. The Scottish economy is now built on whisky, hospitality, tourism and other services. Traditional industrial activities seem viewed with suspicion.

Yet everywhere I visit – towns, villages, heritage centres, museums – I find the same thing: the memory of great industries and the nostalgia of people whose parents and grandparents worked in them. The question that kept nagging at me was why Scotland had built something so remarkable and then let it go. This makes no sense from an African perspective, where governments are desperately striving to achieve what Scotland had.

I wrote this essay the week after the Defence Secretary revealed that the Royal Navy had spent over a month tracking three Russian submarines in the North Atlantic, specifically designed to survey undersea infrastructure in peacetime and sabotage it in conflict. This news finally pushed me to write something I had been contemplating since the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up in 2022.

The UK depends on approximately 62 fibre-optic cables, six gas pipelines and ten electricity interconnectors running along the seabed to connect it with the rest of the world. More than 95% of our internet traffic, three-quarters of our gas, and a significant share of our electricity all arrive this way. This essay maps that infrastructure, examines a series of real incidents where cables and pipelines have been damaged or threatened, considers how drone warfare is changing the threat picture, and asks what the UK government is doing in response.

My biggest concern, having done the research, is not the threat itself but the gap between the scale of the risk and the seriousness of the response. The UK owns no cable repair ships. It has one dedicated ocean surveillance vessel. Churchill worried about U-boats. The modern equivalent is already here, and we are not yet taking it seriously enough.

I wrote this essay because I kept hearing the same conversation everywhere I went. Charities complaining about local government. Local government complaining about the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government complaining about Westminster. Everyone arguing about their share of the pie, and nobody asking how to make the pie bigger. I wrote the outline one evening at my gym in Paisley, on my phone between exercises, because I couldn’t get the subject out of my head.

This essay is my attempt to explain where government money actually comes from and how the UK might get more of it. I work through the four sources of government income, trace how money cascades through the different tiers from Westminster down to local authorities, and then set out six strategies for growing the overall supply. I also examine the risks that could significantly reduce the money available, from cyberattacks and energy shocks to demographic decline and a loss of investor confidence in UK government bonds.

This is not an essay about balancing the budget. That conversation is already happening elsewhere. This is about the less discussed question: where does the money come from, and what does it take to grow it? My perspective is shaped by 25 years of economic development consulting across the UK and Africa, and by the lived experience of emigrating from a country where these are all very real problems.

I wrote this essay over a one-week frenzy in early 2026, in early morning sessions before work and at my local cafe in the afternoons, and in the evenings. Energy policy isn’t my professional speciality, but having lived through almost a decade of scheduled blackouts in South Africa, and paying for expensive energy in the UK, I’ve been paying close attention to how the UK manages its energy.

What follows is an attempt to think through UK energy policy as a systems thinker and strategic-minded observer rather than as a technical expert. I explore the full environmental cost of renewable energy across the entire value chain, the geopolitical risks of depending on China and Russia for critical minerals, why UK energy prices are so high and what drives them, the case for significantly more nuclear power, and why community and state ownership of energy infrastructure matters. I also draw on comparisons with South Africa, France, Norway and South Korea throughout.

This is my honest assessment of the UK’s energy policy and where it needs to invest aggressively before it is too late.